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Perceiving boDieS immeDiately:  
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Abstract: In An inquiry into the Human Mind and in essays on 
intellectual Powers, Thomas Reid discusses what kinds of things 
perceivers are related to in perception. Are these things qualities 
of bodies, the bodies themselves, or both? This question places him 
in a long tradition of trying to understand how human perception 
works in connecting us with the external world. It is still an open 
question in the philosophy of perception whether the human per-
ceptual system is providing us with representations as of bodies or 
only as of their properties. My project in this article is to explain 
how, on Reid’s view, we can have perceptual representations as of 
bodies. This, in turn, enables him to argue that we have a robust 
understanding of the world around us, an understanding that 
would be missing if our perceptual system supplied us with only 
representations as of free-floating properties of objects.
1. IntroductIon
it is an open question in the contemporary philosophy of perception whether the human perceptual system is providing us with repre-
sentations as of bodies—representations that are understood to be 
contentful thoughts with veridicality conditions, which help us segment 
the environment into bodies.1 This question has a rich history and, de-
spite new developments in psychology and philosophy of mind, we still 
do not have an easy way of settling it. some psychologists and philoso-
phers argue that bodies are not immediately perceived; they think that 
we perceive only their features and then infer that bodies having those 
features exist. others argue that bodies are indeed objects of perception 
and that no inference is required for perceiving them.2 A lot depends 
on the answer to this question: if bodies are not objects of perception, is 
there any reason to believe that singular thought is formed in percep-
tion? De re thought must start somewhere, and perception seems to be 
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a suitable candidate here. if we perceived only free-floating properties, 
we would not have a robust understanding of the world around us. in 
the absence of body as a perceptual category, we seem to be burdened 
with Hume’s skepticism about the external world.
 reid scholars have long credited him with shredding the veil of skep-
ticism to pieces.3 But the exact details of this overhaul are still not well 
settled or appreciated.4 There is a tension in the secondary literature, 
engendered by a corresponding tension in reid’s text itself, regarding 
the perception of bodies. The problem is even more acute since this ten-
sion has gone largely unnoticed. one purpose of the present paper is to 
show that perception of bodies is indeed possible on reid’s view and to 
situate his view in the larger context of the aforementioned debate.
 To do so, we should first note that some scholars interpret reid as 
saying that only primary qualities of bodies can be originally and im-
mediately perceived. secondary qualities and bodies are, at most, objects 
of acquired perception.5 other scholars just take it for granted that we 
can (originally) perceive material substances, without noticing that 
they are possibly attributing inconsistent views to reid.6 To address 
this tension, the present paper offers several arguments to show that, 
on reid’s view, bodies can indeed be immediate objects of perception, in 
the sense that veridical perception connects us with actually existing 
bodies, found in the world around us.
 Any discussion concerning the immediate objects of perception must 
start with an explanation of the relevant notion of immediacy. George 
Pappas and Todd Buras discussed the ways in which reidean imme-
diacy could be understood, and throughout this paper, i will use their 
important and correct categorization.7 According to Pappas, there are 
two senses of immediacy that reid employs in his work; according to 
Buras, there are three, as explained below. first, something is said to be 
perceived or known immediately if it is not known in virtue of a proposi-
tional inference. for example, one can know that a mathematical axiom 
is true immediately by just contemplating it, whereas one knows that 
a mathematical theorem is true only by having proved that it follows 
from one or more axioms. The knowledge of the theorem is mediated 
by the inference needed to reach the conclusion. if perception of bodies 
turns out to be immediate in this sense, then it will be said to be epis-
temically immediate. since all perception, according to reid, must be 
epistemically immediate (e.g., EIP ii.5, p. 96), perception of bodies, if at 
all possible on his view, should be understood to have this feature, too.
 second, something is said to be perceived immediately if there are no 
mental entities, for example, ideas, mediating the contact between the 
perceiver’s mind and the external world. if perception of bodies turns 
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out to be immediate in this sense as well as the first, then it will be 
said to be perceptually immediate. since reid is objecting to the “way 
of ideas” (EIP ii. 9; ii. 14), which he thinks his predecessors mistakenly 
put forward, reidean perception of bodies, to be possible on his view, 
should be understood as being perceptually immediate.
 Third, something is said to be perceived immediately if its perception 
is direct. for instance, reid claims that the notion we have of primary 
qualities, in perception, is direct, while the notion we have of secondary 
qualities is relative or indirect.
 for the present purposes, “immediacy” will be taken in the first and 
second sense but not in the third: this paper argues that, for something 
to be perceived immediately, the perception of that object must not be 
based on a propositional inference, and it must also be free of any mental 
intermediaries interfering with the access of the perceiver to the exter-
nal world.8 on the present interpretation, however, something can be 
indirectly but immediately perceived: namely, secondary qualities and 
bodies, since the notions we have of them in perception are relative, not 
direct.9
 We should not find it surprising that interpreters have paid less 
attention to this issue and have offered interpretations that are not 
always consistent with each other, since reid himself is not explicit 
with regard to how bodies or their qualities can be immediately and 
originally perceived. still, the logical space is restricted by the text to 
three possibilities.
 first, physical qualities could be said to be the only immediate objects 
of perception, while the bodies to which they belong are only (at most) 
inferred to exist. Henceforth, this will be called “the qualities-only view.” 
its main disadvantage is that, since bodies are not immediate objects 
of perception, we do not have a simple reply to the skeptic doubting our 
knowledge of bodies.
 second, logic allows for the possibility that only bodies are immediate 
objects of perception. on this view, a body is first perceived and then, by 
an inferential process, certain qualities are attributed to it. This view 
is only apparently supported by some passages in reid. But it is not 
a good view to have. usually, bodies are distinguished by the qualities 
they have. on this view, this is not possible: they are first perceived as 
distinguished objects, and then one attributes some qualities to them; 
but how is the initial process taking place, in the absence of perception 
of qualities? This view is mentioned here only for the sake of complete-
ness, and it will be very briefly discussed in what follows, under the 
name of “the bodies-only view.”
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 Third, the immediate objects of perception could be both qualities 
and the bodies to which they belong. We are said to perceive a body 
by seeing its color, for instance. The perception of the body in question 
is immediate, in the relevant senses: the existence of the substance is 
not propositionally inferred; it is automatically known, by perception. 
Moreover, there are no mental intermediaries that preclude the per-
ceiver from connecting with the body in question. This will be called 
“the qualities-and-bodies view.”10
 There is not enough textual evidence to adjudicate between the first 
and the third possibilities: the majority of passages support the qualities-
only view. in other places, however, reid argues that bodies are also 
perceived, and at least one passage may be interpreted as supporting 
the bodies-only view. This last interpretation does not have a lot to back 
it up, but the fact that some passages support the first view while others 
support the third view remains. To address this tension, this paper will 
look at the broader context and conclude that there are strong reasons, 
internal to reid’s philosophy, for thinking that both qualities of bodies 
and the bodies to which they belong are objects of perception. Although 
the text is vexed and, passage by passage, it cannot be established what 
reid’s view on this issue actually is, the qualities-and-bodies view is 
the one he should have adopted, given his larger epistemological and 
metaphysical concerns.
2. evIdence thAt QuAlItIes Are  
ImmedIAte objects of PercePtIon
in his earlier work An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles 
of Common Sense (IHM henceforth), reid does not say a lot about what 
the objects of perception are. He argues that perception necessarily 
involves a conception of the object of perception and a belief that such 
an object exists: “the perception of an object implies both a conception 
of its form, and a belief of its present existence. i know moreover that 
this belief is not the effect of argumentation and reasoning; it is the 
immediate effect of my constitution” (IHM 6. 20, p. 168). This is seen 
as the precursor of the “official characterization” of perception, of-
fered in his later work Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (EIP 
henceforth):
if, therefore, we attend to that act of our mind which we call the 
perception of an external object of sense, we shall find in it these 
three things. First, some conception or notion of the object perceived. 
Secondly, A strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present 
existence. And, thirdly, That this conviction and belief are immediate, 
and not the effect of reasoning. (EIP ii. 5, p. 96)
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so, whatever kinds of things may be objects of perception, one must be 
able to conceive them and immediately and noninferentially believe that 
they exist, if one is to be said to perceive them.
 in IHM, there is just one other place where the issue of what can 
actually be perceived is briefly touched on. reid argues that there are 
two kinds of perceptions: original and acquired. Without going into 
any details concerning the distinction between original and acquired 
perception, i would like to draw the reader’s attention to this passage 
for different reasons.11 in it, reid suggests that the things immediately 
perceived are either primary or secondary qualities of bodies, but not 
bodies:
our perceptions are of two kinds: some are natural and original, 
others acquired, and the fruit of experience. When i perceive that this 
is the taste of cyder, that of brandy; that this is the smell of an apple, 
that of an orange; . . . these perceptions, and others of the same kind, 
are not original, they are acquired. But the perception which i have 
by touch, of the hardness and softness of bodies, of their extension, 
figure and motion, is not acquired, it is original. (IHM 6. 20, p. 171)
some matters are quite unclear, but what is crucial for the present 
investigation is that perceptual experiences start from external quali-
ties of bodies. We are not told whether bodies enter the picture at the 
perceptual level or at an inferential level. Going by just the evidence 
presented by this passage, the qualities-only view seems to fare better 
than the qualities-and-bodies view.
 The text of EIP does not provide an unequivocal answer to the 
question regarding the immediate objects of perception either. The 
qualities-only view is well represented throughout the book, and reid 
seems to be at his clearest when he argues in favor of this view.
 in the opening essay of the book, reid argues that
[a]ll the things which we immediately perceive by our senses, and all 
the things we are conscious of, are things which must be in something 
else as their subject. Thus by my senses, i perceive figure, colour, 
hardness softness, motion, resistance, and such like things. But these 
are qualities, and must necessarily be in something that is figured, 
coloured, hard or soft, that moves, or resist. it is not to these quali-
ties, but to that which is the subject of them, that we give the name 
of body. (EIP i. 2, p. 43)
 Qualities of bodies are the only things one perceives immediately, 
according to this passage. Moreover, whenever we perceive a quality we 
know that a body having that quality exists. What is unclear is whether 
we know of that body’s existence by perception of the body. This passage 
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seems to tilt the scales toward the qualities-only view and to suggest 
that, although we learn that bodies exist, we do not do it by perceiving 
them.
 The next relevant passage is the opening sentence of the section 
titled “The objects of Perception; and first, of primary and secondary 
Qualities”: “The objects of perception are the various qualities of bod-
ies” (EIP ii. 17, p. 200). if reid had wanted to indicate that other kinds 
of things besides qualities of substances are to be counted as objects of 
perception, he would have probably written something like “qualities 
of bodies are among the things perceived.” And then it would not be 
unreasonable to expect a more or less detailed discussion of what is 
interesting about the other types of things that can be objects of this 
faculty. However, such a discussion is nowhere to be found in the rest 
of that section (or anywhere in the book, for that matter). Moreover, the 
next section (EIP ii. 18) extends the list of things that can be immediate 
objects of perception, but that list contains only qualities, too:
Besides primary qualities and secondary qualities of bodies, there are 
many other immediate objects of perception. Without pretending to a 
complete enumeration, i think they mostly fall under one or other of 
the following classes. 1st, certain states or conditions of our own bodies. 
2d, Mechanical powers or forces. 3d, chemical powers. 4th, Medical 
powers or virtues. 5th, Vegetable and animal powers. (EIP ii. 18, p. 211, 
emphasis added)
 This list, although not exhaustive, does not count bodies among the 
things that can be immediately perceived. one issue is that bodies 
are more important than some of the things reid included on this list, 
and still they are left out. Judging from these passages alone, which 
are unequivocally addressing the nature of the immediate objects of 
perception (taken extensionally), bodies are more like an afterthought 
of perception rather than its immediate objects: in order to think about 
them, one must perceive their qualities.
3. evIdence thAt bodIes Are  
ImmedIAte objects of PercePtIon
contrary to the conclusion of the previous section, other textual evi-
dence indicates that, according to reid, our senses themselves give us 
knowledge of bodies. This is first seen in a section of the second essay, 
dedicated to discussing the information our senses give us about matter 
and space.12 There, reid argues that the notion we have of bodies, in 
perception, is relative, in the sense that we have a conception of matter 
only inasmuch as we have direct conceptions of its qualities. However, 
just because we can have only a relative notion of something, it does 
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not mean that we cannot perceive that thing immediately. saying that 
our notion of bodies is relative tells us something about the kind of 
thoughts we have of them, but not about the way we come to have such 
thoughts or about the type of knowledge they encode.13 A case in point 
is color, which is a secondary quality, of which we can have only relative 
notions, but which we perceive originally and immediately (IHM 6. 20, 
p. 171; EIP ii. 21, p. 236). so, the fact that the notion we have of bodies 
is relative does not count against our ability to perceive them immedi-
ately. To better understand this issue, think about the way we perceive 
a cube by perceiving its facing side: we perceive the cube immediately 
by perceiving its facing side. The same can and should be said about the 
way the qualities of the cube contribute to our perception of the cube: 
by perceiving a colored figure, we actually perceive the cube itself. We 
should not think that we first see the color and figure and then the cube.
 it must be noted that we see bodies by seeing their qualities, not the 
other way around. Human perception is sensitive to the asymmetrical 
relation that exists between bodies and their qualities: qualities belong 
to bodies, while bodies do not belong to qualities. However, according 
to reid, one does not use one’s inferential capacities to reach a body 
via one of its qualities, in perception. it is an important point for reid’s 
epistemology that reasoning is not involved in the perceptual process: 
it is not in virtue of a perceiver’s thinking that he knows a body having 
a certain color exists, whenever he sees that color. it is in virtue of our 
constitution that we perceive bodies whenever we perceive qualities, and 
this type of perception can, therefore, count as epistemically immediate.
 it is a matter of interpretation whether reid argues that we are 
hard-wired to perceive bodies by perceiving their qualities. Two of the 
first principles of common sense that reid uses to justify his whole 
enterprise support this interpretation. The first one, given in the first 
essay, states: “i take for granted that there are some things which cannot 
exist by themselves, but must be in something else to which they belong, 
as qualities or attributes” (EIP i. 2, p. 43). This metaphysical principle 
is mirrored by one of the principles of necessary truths, discussed in 
the sixth essay: “[T]he qualities which we perceive by our senses must 
have a subject, which we call body” (EIP Vi. 6, p. 495). These principles 
tell us only that qualities cannot exist on their own. They do not tell us 
anything about how perception of bodies comes about. However, we do 
have knowledge of bodies, and this knowledge is based on our senses, 
reid thinks. He argues that, even as infants, we know that beings other 
than ourselves exist (mother, father, and so forth) and that we know 
this by the “testimony of our senses” (EIP Vi. 5, p. 477). one question 
is whether we gain this knowledge perceptually or inferentially. if we 
used one or both of these principles as steps or rules in an inference, to 
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contribute to our “perception” of bodies, that perceptual knowledge of 
bodies would not be epistemically immediate. However, as Keith lehrer 
showed, first principles, in reid’s philosophy, should be understood as 
being explanatory rules, providing a way of understanding how the hu-
man mind functions, just as a law of physics provides a way of better 
understanding a certain physical phenomenon.14 if we agree that this 
is the function of first principles, the knowledge we have of bodies in 
perception is epistemically immediate, and not the effect of reasoning.
 it is an additional question whether this type of perception of bodies 
can and should count as perceptually immediate. one might object that, 
on such a view, in order to perceive a body, a perceiver must be aware 
of the perception of a quality of that body and, in that sense, it might 
be thought that the perception of the quality is a thought intermediary 
between the perceiver and the external body. To answer this objection, we 
should again think about the way reid understands human perception, 
based on the two principles of common sense discussed above. A natural 
law describing the human perceptual process states that, whenever we 
perceive qualities, our minds are immediately (noninferentially) aware 
of bodies having those qualities. it is not the awareness of the perception 
of the quality that leads us to the external body; it is the awareness of 
the quality itself that results in our perceiving the body itself. As Van 
cleve argues, according to reid, perceptually mediated perception is 
an “oxymoron”: we are said to perceive something only if we perceive it 
without any intermediaries.15
 Bearing all of this in mind, let us look at some relevant passages, 
which, when read in this light, show that bodies are indeed perceived, 
whenever their qualities are perceived:
i perceive in a billiard ball, figure, colour, and motion; but the ball is 
not figure, nor is it colour, nor motion, nor all these taken together; 
it is something that has figure, and colour, and motion. This is a 
dictate of Nature, and the belief of all mankind. As to the nature of 
this something, i am afraid we can give little account of it, but that 
it has the qualities which our senses discover. (EIP ii. 19, p. 217–18)
We are said to perceive color, figure, etc, in a billiard ball. it is difficult 
to understand how this is possible without perceiving the billiard ball 
itself. The qualities of a body need a body to belong to; they cannot exist 
by themselves. But without perceiving the body they belong to, how can 
we know to which body they belong? in this particular case, it is a dictate 
of nature that the perceived qualities belong to a material substance, 
but it cannot be a dictate of nature that they belonged to a billiard ball, 
instead of something else. The attribution of such-and-such qualities to a 
body cannot be explained solely by invoking natural laws. i take reid to 
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be arguing that there is no way of recovering the immediate knowledge 
of the existence of the body by perceiving only a certain combination 
of qualities. This passage indicates that the qualities-and-bodies view 
is better suited to explain how different pieces of the puzzle are held 
together in perception.
 The following passage reinforces this interpretation:
it seems therefore to be a judgment of nature, that the things imme-
diately perceived are qualities, which must belong to a subject; and 
all the information that our senses give us about this subject, is, that 
it is that to which such qualities belong. (EIP ii. 19, p. 218)
We are told that we immediately perceive qualities and that they need 
a subject in which to inhere, which cannot be anything but a body. since 
no quality can exist by itself and since perception tells us that qualities 
exist, their subjects must exist too. reid thinks that we do not reach 
this conclusion by reasoning: it is a dictate of nature and immediately 
available to everyone undergoing a perceptual experience. The belief 
in the existence of a material substance, supporting the qualities thus 
perceived, is as immediate as the belief in the existence of the material 
qualities themselves.
 Thus, by perception of qualities, we have a relative notion of the sub-
ject to which they belong and an immediate belief in the existence of this 
subject. Two necessary conditions for perception are, therefore, met for 
body, just as they are met for the secondary quality of color (IHM 6. 20, 
p. 171; EIP ii. 21, p. 236).16 There is no reason to discount the idea that 
bodies are perceived, any more than there is for the idea that color is 
perceived.
 one last piece of indirect evidence that bodies, as well as their quali-
ties, are immediate objects of sense is supplied by the following passage:
i think it requires some ripeness of understanding to distinguish the 
qualities of a body from the body. Perhaps this distinction is not made 
by brutes, nor by infants; and if any one thinks that this distinction is 
not made by our senses, but by some other power of the mind, i will 
not dispute this point, provided it be granted, that men, when their 
faculties are ripe, have a natural conviction, that sensible qualities 
cannot exist by themselves without some subject to which they belong. 
(EIP ii. 19, p. 219)
Here reid argues that, to distinguish qualities from bodies, one must 
either have their sense faculties fully developed or some of the other 
faculties, possibly abstraction and reasoning, must be usable to their 
fullest capacity. furthermore, it is probably because we lack any clear 
notions of qualities and bodies that we are unable to distinguish them 
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early on in our development. This, in turn, suggests that reid thinks that 
it is at least a metaphysical possibility that, in our infancy, perception 
does not have enough power to mark qualities as separate from bodies.
 suppose, however, that infants perceived only qualities and that the 
existence of the bodies these qualities belonged to were inferred, based 
on the perception of their qualities. on this scenario, our senses would 
not inform us of the existence of bodies. infants would lack not only 
the ability to know that “sensible qualities cannot exist by themselves 
without some subject to which they belong” but also the ability to per-
ceive bodies as well as qualities. However, this is not how reid thinks 
of the issue. He argues that mature human beings are able to draw the 
distinction in question because both types of things—qualities and bod-
ies—are objects of perception. since drawing a distinction does not add 
any element to an equation but helps to separate already existing ones, 
it is clear that the distinction in question can be drawn only between 
things that are already present to the mind.
 Based on the evidence discussed so far, reid seems to be endorsing one 
of the qualities view, but not the bodies-only view. At the outset, i said 
that one passage might be seen as providing support for the last view:
if i may trust the faculties that God has given me, i do perceive 
matter objectively, that is, something which is extended and solid, 
which may be measured and weighed, is the immediate object of my 
touch and sight. And this object i take to be matter, and not an idea. 
(EIP ii. 11, p. 154)
reid writes this in the course of discussing Berkeley’s idealist system. His 
main concern is to argue that what we perceive is physical and external 
to our mind, not just an idea, which is mental and thus internal. reid 
argues that matter is the immediate object of one’s perception—at least 
of the senses of sight and touch. if we think that the use of the definite 
article indicates that matter, namely, body (since reid uses these terms 
interchangeably), is exclusively the object of perception, this passage 
will be seen to contradict all the passages surveyed so far. But this is not 
the only interpretation possible: the use of the definite article indicates 
exclusivity, but of a different kind. The contrast here is between things 
of the physical world and things of the mind, and, by using the phrase 
“the immediate object of my touch and sight” to describe matter, reid 
flags his opposition to Berkeley and the tradition to which he belongs. No 
mental entities, be they ideas or something else, are immediate objects 
of perception; the only things that have that role are material objects. 
read in this light, this passage supports the idea that bodies, too, are 
immediate objects of perception, just as their qualities are. it does not 
support the bodies-only view, but the qualities-and-bodies one.
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 one problem remains, however: reid is inconsistent in his claims. 
He sometimes argues that only qualities can be immediately perceived, 
while, at other times, he says that bodies are immediate objects of per-
ception. To address this issue, the next section discusses some reidean 
reasons for endorsing the qualities-and-bodies view.
4. WhIch vIeW should reId hAve AdoPted?
The qualities-and-bodies view agrees more with the rest of reid’s philoso-
phy than the qualities-only view, which is the only other viable option. To 
show that this is so, let us look at some arguments against the qualities-
only view and some advantages of the qualities-and-bodies view.
4.1. An Argument against the Qualities-only View
reid should have supported the qualities-and-bodies view for at least 
two reasons, which i discuss in turn. The first is an argument meant to 
clear away some obstacles to the qualities-and-bodies view, rather than 
to support it directly. it provides grounds for rejecting both the qualities-
only view and the bodies-only view, but since the latter view lacks clear 
textual support and it is a bad view to have anyway, i focus on showing 
that someone with reid’s philosophical commitments should not endorse 
the former. let us call this argument “no knowledge of bodies without 
knowledge of qualities.”
 To fully understand this argument, we need a more detailed analysis 
of the process of perception, to which i now turn. reid argues that two 
other faculties are necessary ingredients of every perceptual experience. 
As already indicated, the official characterization of perception, in EIP, 
requires the perceiver to have a conception of the object perceived and 
a belief in its present existence that is “immediate, and not the effect 
of reasoning” (EIP ii. 5, p. 96). Before going any further, i would like to 
explain how “perceptual conception” and “perceptual belief” work.17
 With regard to perceptual conception, i subscribe to the view that it is 
akin to russellian acquaintance, as William Alston and Van cleve have 
argued.18 Alston argues that perceptual conception is not about the use 
of “general concepts”; hence, its role is not to subsume an object under 
a concept.19 Another way to put this point is that perceptual conception 
does not have any kind of conceptual content; its role is to present the 
bare object to the mind of the perceiver, without focusing the attention 
on what kind of object that is.20 Perceptual conception does not function 
as a faculty that explicitly predicates properties of objects; its content 
is not given by descriptive propositions.
 However, we do form some notion of what kind of properties and/or 
bodies we perceive, so, if conception is not responsible for indicating what 
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attributes the substances have, one could think that that role is played 
by “perceptual belief,” copenhaver argues; but i think that there is not 
enough textual evidence to support this interpretation.21 reid consistently 
says only that, in perception, one is seized by a belief that the object per-
ceptually conceived exists when it is thus conceived.22 This can be seen as 
attributing a certain type of property—namely, existence—to the object of 
perceptual conception. However, this is not full-blown predicate attribu-
tion, not even on the assumption that existence is indeed a predicate. one 
may believe that something exists without thinking that it is a certain 
kind of something. for instance, someone may see something at a great 
distance and have no idea whether it is a rock or a man with an umbrella 
and still believe that what he sees (whatever that is) does indeed exist. 
furthermore, perceptual belief attributes the same property to every 
object that is perceptually conceived. in order for perceptual belief to 
work as copenhaver says it does, it would have to attribute properties 
like colors, shapes, or sizes to the objects perceptually conceived, and 
reid says nothing about perceptual belief having this role. so, contra 
copenhaver, perceptual conception presents a physical substance to 
the mind, without describing it as some specific type of substance, and 
perceptual belief just affirms the existence of the thing thus conceived.
 on this understanding of perceptual conception and belief, material 
substances cannot be the only immediate objects of perception. if bodies 
were the sole objects of perception, we would not get enough information 
to specify where a body ends and another begins. Nothing would help 
us identify the figure, size, color, and so forth of the respective body.
 Nor can qualities of material substances be the only immediate ob-
jects of perception. if all that we perceived were colors, shapes, sizes, 
and such, we would have no way of entertaining singular thoughts 
about the substances themselves, in perception. i could never think 
about my friend that i am just seeing, without that thought being en-
tirely descriptive. if taken to the extreme, this view would have bodies 
be logical reconstructions out of the physical qualities one perceived, 
as in russell’s logical atomism, where bodies are nothing more than 
logical constructs out of our sense data.23 on such a view, a body would 
not be perceived, but understood to exist as that thing, whatever it is, 
that satisfies a certain description. The table i am currently touching 
would be thought of as being whatever object simultaneously has this 
particular texture, together with this particular rectangular shape and 
this particular size. This is a counterintuitive view. My intuition here 
aligns with that of those philosophers, reid among them, who think that 
singular thoughts about material substances are required for knowledge 
of the material world.24 Without being able to supply singular thoughts 
about real, existing objects, perception would fail to satisfy our continued 
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interest in material objects, even when certain of their qualities have 
changed. We want to be able to talk about the tree outside our window 
both in summer and in winter, even though many of the visible qualities 
that it has during the summer are altogether absent in the winter. our 
interest in an object survives the loss of some of its qualities, and reid 
is one of the first philosophers to recognize and attempt to explain the 
role of perception in the production of singular thoughts.
 immediate perception of bodies has another advantage for reid. in 
some of the passages discussed so far, reid argues that our perceptual 
faculty cannot stop at qualities; it has to have a way of getting information 
about the body having those qualities. This is meant to help reid rebut 
a particular brand of skepticism, which claims that having perceptual 
knowledge of qualities of objects is not enough to gain knowledge of the 
world. This skeptic would say that, in order to claim knowledge about the 
material world, one’s mind must have a way of getting direct access to the 
bodies populating that world.25 reid, of course, would want to show that 
this type of skepticism is as wrong and contrary to common sense as any 
other kind. These reasons should rule out the qualities-only view.
 The combined view is the only one able to do all this work. if the 
immediate objects of perception are both qualities and the bodies they 
belong to, we learn quite a lot about the external world by perception. 
We conceive of and believe in the existence of color, figure, size, and so 
forth as instantiated in the body currently perceived. even if this type 
of conception is nonconceptual, in the sense that it does not descriptively 
inform me that red is presently existing in my immediate environment, 
we will end up knowing more about the body to which those qualities 
belong, if we take both its qualities and itself to be immediate objects of 
perception. Namely, we learn that there are qualities, and, since quali-
ties cannot exist by themselves, we also learn that they belong to a body 
that is currently existent. We move past the qualities, to their subject, 
and we are thus capable of entertaining singular thoughts about that 
body itself. on the bodies-only view, we would know only that there is a 
material substance existing before me—but it would be hard to see how 
we learn what kind of substance that is. on the qualities-only model, we 
would know only that certain qualities presently exist—but this would 
not give us the substance itself.
4.2. Dispelling an objection against  
the Qualities-and-Bodies View
The first reason did not directly favor the combined view but showed 
that both of the other views are wrong. The present argument is meant 
to dispel an apparent objection to the qualities-and-bodies view. for all 
that has been said so far, one might think that we can perceive bodies 
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only if we know their essences, since otherwise our notions of them are 
quite obscure. But we do not have such knowledge, according to reid: 
only the creator of these substances has access to their essences. so, the 
objection goes, we cannot perceive bodies. To show that this objection 
does not work, i argue that knowledge of a substance’s essence is not 
required for perception of that substance.
 let us look at the relevant passage, and see what conclusions we can 
draw:
[o]ur conception of [individuals] is always inadequate and lame. They 
are the creatures of God, and there are many things belonging to them 
which we know not, and which cannot be deduced by reasoning from 
what we know: They have a real essence, or constitution of nature, 
from which all their qualities flow; but this essence our faculties do 
not comprehend: They are therefore incapable of definition; for a 
definition ought to comprehend the whole nature or essence of the 
thing defined. (EIP iV. 1, p. 303)
even if we thought that we can perceive only things we know the nature 
of, this would not show that bodies cannot be objects of perception. At 
most, this would show that bodies cannot be perceived without other 
things being also perceived, namely, their qualities. By perceiving bod-
ies via their qualities, we would not find out what is the nature of the 
material substances themselves, but we would definitely learn something 
about them: they have a certain color, shape, and so forth.
 The objection would have some force, on the assumption that we 
perceive only bodies. if that were the case, reid would need to explain 
why our perception of bodies does not give us knowledge of their es-
sences. if perception were just a relation between a perceiver and a body, 
such a limitation would be mysterious. However, on his understanding 
of perception, we can acquire an immediate knowledge that certain 
qualities exist in the real world and also immediate knowledge that 
certain qualities belong to certain bodies. Perception gives us enough 
information to know that certain qualities belong to certain bodies, but 
not enough information to know which qualities constitute the essence 
of a certain body. This, however, should not be surprising, given reid’s 
idea that only their creator knows the real natures of substances.
 let us take stock. reid should not adopt the bodies-only view, since, 
on this view, perception would not provide crucial information regard-
ing what type of object one is perceiving. He should also not adopt the 
qualities-only view, since, on this view, perception is incapable of giv-
ing us singular thoughts about the objects perceived. He should have 
adopted the combined view, since it is the most attuned to his overall 
epistemological commitments.
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5. concludIng remArks
Although the evidence that reid consistently thought that qualities and 
material substances are immediate objects of perception is not conclu-
sive, this paper offered several arguments to show that his writings not 
only allow for this view but also support it better than any of the compet-
ing ones. Material substances are immediate objects of perception; they 
are just not bare objects of perception: we need to perceive some of their 
qualities, in order to perceive them. Bodies do indeed populate the world 
around us; we just interact with them with the help of their qualities.
 Thus, this paper argued, one should not disregard the passages fa-
voring the qualities-and-bodies view, even though they are at odds with 
those supporting the qualities-only view. While one should acknowledge 
this tension, one should also look at the broader context, provided by 
reid’s general philosophical commitments, before deciding which of 
these views is better. The qualities-and-bodies view is the view that 
reid should have endorsed. An explanation of how perception of bodies 
actually works, and what role the qualities of bodies actually play, is 
needed, but such an explanation would have taken us too far from the 
main considerations of the present paper and is best left for a future 
occasion.26
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not be met with disapproval. reidean thoughts have contents and, if the contents 
are perceptual, they may match the reality or not, depending on the circum-
stances (see, for instance, his discussion about the errors of perception, in EIP 
ii. 21 and 22). reid’s key antirepresentationalist criticism is that, if we allow 
ideas as intermediaries between our minds and the external world, we lose the 
battle with skepticism: we do not perceive the world; we perceive only more or 
less accurate mental images of the world. Having contentful thoughts about 
the objects around us, however, does not lead to any kind of mediation between 
the mind and the world. The objects themselves (be they qualities or bodies) 
are the things that are immediately perceived, and this is all that matters for 
the present discussion.
2. for more details on this debate, see Tyler Burge, Origins of Objectivity 
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perceptual attributive and that our perceptual apparatus gives us represen-
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113–14.
11. The contrast reid draws between original and acquired perception is 
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